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UNFAIR COMPETITION-FALSE AnVERTISING-ScoPE OF FEDERAL JurusDICTION UNDER SECTION 43 (a) OF LANHAM ACT-Plaintiff brought suit
in a state court seeking injunctive relief, alleging unfair competition by
defendant in manufacturing and selling slavish copies of plaintiff's swimsuits. One of the six causes of action alleged in the complaint was based
on a violation of section 43 (a) of the Lanham Act.1 Defendant had
the suit removed to federal district court. On motion to remand, held,
denied. The alleged violation of section 43 (a) created a federal right of
action within the original jurisdiction of the federal courts. Catalina, Inc.
v. Gem Swimwear, Inc., (S.D. N.Y. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 911.
At common law "passing off" of defendant's goods as those of the
plaintiff has traditionally been considered to be an essential element
of a suit for unfair competition.2 Thus, as an example, misrepresentation
of the quality of one's product could not become the basis of a cause
of action by a competitor, simply because the magic element of "passing
off" was lacking. The rule has been justified on the ground that abandonment of this limitation would open to the courts a virtual "Pandora's

1 60 Stat. 441 (1946), 15 U.S.C. (1952) §1125(a): "Any person who shall affix, apply,
or annex, or use in connection with any goods or services, or any container or containers
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description or representation, including words or other symbols tending falsely to describe or represent the same, and
shall cause such goods or services to enter into commerce, . . • shall be liable to a
civil action by any person doing business in the locality falsely indicated as that of origin
or in the region in which said locality is situated, or by any person who believes that
he is or is likely to be damaged by the use of any such false description or representation."
2 American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., (6th Cir. 1900) 103 F. 281. But cf.
Anheuser-Busch Brewing Assn. v. Fred Miller Brewing Co., (C.C. Wis. 1898) 87 F. 864.
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box" of possible litigation.3 Notwithstanding severe cr1tic1sm concerning the narrowness of the rule4 and despite a limited judicial departure
where plaintiff had a monopoly5 or was an association of all competing
producers in a particular geographical area, 6 this requirement continued
to be applied until passage of the Lanham Act in 1946. Section 43 (a) was
proclaimed as establishing a federal substantive law of unfair competition
covering all cases of false designation of origin and false description of
goods in commerce, giving a party injured or likely to be injured by the
false advertising the right to relief in a federal court.7 The terms of the
statute would seem to justify this interpretation. In one of the first cases
decided under section 43 (a), however, the Ninth Circuit rejected such an
interpretation and continued to require "passing off" as an essential
element of complainant's cause of action. 8 While admitting that the section could be construed otherwise, it was felt that no fundamental change
in the existing law of unfair competition was intended. Thus that court
would still require a showing that as a result of defendant's conduct his
goods were being sold as those of the complainant.9 While it has been
suggested that the facts in that case did not entitle the complainant to relief
even under a more liberal interpretation of section 43 (a),10 the basis on
which the court chose to refuse relief has been sharply criticized because
it ignores both the clear language of the statute and the legislative history
behind passage of the act.11 In L'Aiglon Apparel v. Lana Lobell, Inc.,12

American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Mfg. Co., note 2 supra, at 286.
Handler, "False and Misleading Advertising," 39 YALE L. J. 22 at 37 (1929).
5 Ely-Norris Safe Co. v. Mosler Safe Co., (2d Cir. 1925) 7 F. (2d) 603, revd. on other
grounds 273 U.S. 132 (1927).
6 Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. Grand Rapids Furniture Co., (7th Cir. 1942) 127 F.
(2d) 245, cert. den. 321 U.S. 771 (1944); Pillsbury-Washburn Flour Mill Co. v. Eagle,
(7th Cir. 1898) 86 F. 608, cert. den. 173 U.S. 703 (1899). But see California Apparel
Creators v. Wieder of California, (2d Cir. 1947) 162 F. (2d) 893, cert. den. 332 U.S. 816
(1947).
7 Bunn, "The National Law of Unfair Competition," 62 HARV. L. REv. 987 at 999
(1949); Callmann, "False Advertising as a Competitive Tort," 48 CoL. L. REv. 876 at
885 (1948).
8 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., (9th Cir. 1951) 186 F. (2d) 923. Accord,
Samson Crane Co. v. Union Nat. Sales, (D.C. Mass. 1949) 87 F. Supp. 218, affd. per
curiam (1st Cir. 1950) 180 F. (2d) 896. See Rosaire v. Baroid Sales Division, National
Lead Co., (S.D. Tex. 1954) 120 F. Supp. 20, alfd. (5th Cir. 1955) 218 F. (2d) 72, cert. den.
349 U.S. 916 (1955), for a case in which §43(a) appears not to have been raised by counsel
as a basis for federal jurisdiction and the district court continued to apply the "passing
off" doctrine as a requisite to relief for unfair competition.
9 Chamberlain v. Columbia Pictures Corp., note 8 supra, at 925.
10 Derenberg, "Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First Decade of
the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?" 32 N.Y. UNIV. L. REv. 1029 at 1037 (1957).
11 Leidy, "Competitors' Remedy for False Description," 43 TRADE-MARK REP. 1109
at 1118 (1953); Diggins, "The Lanham Trade-Mark Act," 37 TRADE-MARK REP. 305 at
444 (1947).
12 (3d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 649. The decision in this case was recently followed in
Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., (3d Cir. 1958) 255 F. (2d) 641. 4 ToRTs RE3
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the Third Circuit reached a more realistic result, specifically rejecting the
Ninth Circuit approach and construing section 43 (a) as going beyond the
"passing off" doctrine. The District of Columbia Circuit13 and the court
in the principal case have followed this view. To secure relief under section 43 (a), plaintiff must prove (I) that defendant's advertisement is
false, (2) that a substantial number of customers were likely to be misled,
(3) that the misrepresentation was a material inducement to purchase
defendant's product, and (4) that trade has been diverted or is likely to
be diverted from plaintiff or that the good will which plaintiff's own
product enjoyed with the buying public has been injured.14 Section 43 (a)
should be considered as establishing an affirmative code of business ethics
whose standards can be enforced by any competitor likely to be injured
as a result of the false advertising.15 Although the Second Circuit has not
directly passed on this issue, some indication of its position lies in a
recent concurring opinion of Judge Clark, in which specific approval
is given the Third Circuit's broad interpretation of section 43 (a).16 In
applying this broad interpretation the principal case provides attorneys
with another indication of the opportunities existing under the Lanham
Act to prevent, through injunctive relief and actions for damages, the
serious injury that is likely to result when a client's competitor engages
in false advertising.
John D. Kelly, S.Ed.

STATEMENT §761 (1939), appears -to expand the basis of relief beyond the "passing off"
doctrine in terms not unlike those used in §43(a).
13 Gold Seal Company v. Weeks, (D.C. D.C. 1955) 129 F. Supp. 928, affd. sub nom.
S.C. Johnson and Son, Inc., v. Gold Seal Co., (D.C. Cir. 1956) 230 F. (2d) 832, cert. den.
352 U.S. 829 (1956).
14 Weil, "Protectibility of Trademark Values Against False Competitive Advertising,''
44 CALIF. L. REv. 527 at 537 (1956).
15 Gold Seal Company v. Weeks, note 13 supra, at 940. See 1 CALI.MANN, THE LAW OF
UNFAIR COMPETITION AND TRADE-MARKS, 2d ed., §6.2(c) (1950).
16 Maternally Yours v. Your .Maternity Shop, (2d Cir. 1955) 234 F. (2d) 538 at 546.
See also footnotes 1 and 5 of the opinion of Waterman, J., at 540 and 544.

